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 The Secretary of State John Kerry's remark on 12 February at the State Department in Washington in the presence of Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera that he was "going to talk (with Minister Samaraweera) about President Sirisena's thoughts about how to move Sri Lanka away from 30 years of war with the Tamils" was not a slip of the tong but a deep-rooted belief of American foreign policy handlers for decades, was the view of the Asian Tribune when it first reported Kerry's pronouncement.

That was his understanding of the battle between the separatist/terrorist Tamil Tigers and the successive governments of Sri Lanka when he was the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a very long time before joining Obama's cabinet in 2013.

And that was the understanding of the US State Department during the twenty six-years of the battle.
The following narrative depicts how the 'War with the Tamils' notion formed the basis of the narrative of American foreign policy handlers that came all the way from the eighties right out of the mouth of America's top diplomat John Kerry on 12 February to which Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Samaraweera took no attempt to straighten the record.

Somewhere in 1991, a year or so since the brutal suppression of Sri Lanka's southern Marxist rebel group JVP along with the questionable death of its leader Rohana Wijeweera in November 1989, a group of foreign service officers (FSOs) at Colombo's American Embassy was in a routine meeting to exchange views, discuss political issues developing at that time of the host country, and figure out what Washington needed to know to facilitate the development of policy planks regarding Sri Lanka.

The significant issues as recalled by this writer who was part of that group as the diplomatic mission's political specialist were; (a) the Tamil Tiger or LTTE's lethal campaign in the north-east region (b) the tension in the rest of the country due to the mayhem created by the separatist group (c) Sinhalese-Tamil race relations (d)the political strategy of the government and the operational maneuvers of its armed forces, and (e) the Tamil 'National Issue' and related grievances, and Sinhalese reactions to such issues.

This was the period, commenced in early 1980s, the U.S. diplomatic mission was deep into a serious project of understanding the nuances of Sri Lanka's ethnic problems and related issues while focusing toward the Tamil Tiger campaign to be part of the discourse to develop comprehensive policy planks for the Washington policymakers and Capitol Hill lawmakers.

Despite the Tamil Tiger movement unleashed nation-wide terrorism that Colombo American diplomatic mission and Washington decried, many among the US diplomatic corps strongly felt that the Tiger movement grew to address minority Tamil grievances as opposed to the increased Sinhalese domination in the governing apparatus since the sixties.

The perspective of Tamil National Question was taking shape along with critical national issues, and the mind-set of the FSOs and their Washington colleagues were being developed as to how the Sri Lankan polity reacted, manner in which it framed policies and the obstacles on GSL path to implement some of the agreed policy planks, and reaction to such policy implementation.

The said routine meeting's atmosphere took a different turn when one of the FSO's made a comment with displayed authority that "Sinhalese army is killing the Tamils" referring to the ongoing military operation in the north-east region combating separatist LTTE.

Prior to this 'comment' was made, this writer who had several official/personal meetings with the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) the North General Denzil Kobbekaduwa in his office in Colombo had briefed the Colombo Diplomatic Mission of the progress of military operations against the Tigers some of which were quite sensitive in nature. The writer used his old school ties with General Kobbekaduwa to get a deeper understanding of events in the north and the political maneuvering in the south as the General was well connected to principal players in the political stage at that time one being the opposition leader Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike, his close relative.

Why did the 'Sinhalese army killing the Tamils' sentiment creep into the mind-set of the FSOs: In later years it was seen as a catalyst of American foreign policy to develop other policy planks surrounding Sri Lanka issues, and one could see the serious consequences to Sri Lanka's global image in subsequent years leading to the military defeat of the Tigers in May 2009 and thereafter . Nevertheless, General Kobbekaduwa, who was leading the anti-LTTE operation during this period, was highly regarded as a soldier who was compassionate toward Tamil civilians.

This writer already in several briefings had told the hierarchy of Colombo's American diplomatic mission that Kobbekaduwa used three principles in his counter terrorist war measures:

firstly, he did not believe in holding down land,

secondly, he believed in drawing the enemy away from populated areas to minimize civilian deaths and with advance maneuvering and superior firepower strain and destroy the enemy firepower, and
thirdly make the civilians realize that they were better off trusting the armed forces. In fact, the UNHCR once paid a tribute to him for his humanitarian approach to the beleaguered Tamil population.

This writer , an insider working closely with American officials for a very long time with broad acceptance , explained to those who were at this meeting that the government and its security forces considered both the LTTE and JVP as enemy combatants and were equally a threat to national security, and despite the Tiger fighting cadre were totally of ethnic Tamils and the JVP cadre were all Sinhalese the security forces treated both groups as threats to national security, and defeating the Tigers and the JVP cannot be interpreted as defeating the Tamils and the Sinhalese respectively.

But the FSO who made the 'killing' remark was joined by at least two other FSOs to distinguish between the two movements, one made up of ethnic Tamils who had fewer influence over a polity largely controlled by the majority Sinhalese thus advocating self-determination for the Tamil people, and the other with ideological differences aimed at a regime change.

With Secretary Kerry's remark, one cannot separate the two

(1) Sinhalese army killing the Tamils and

(2) Thirty-year war with the Tamils,

- as both have gone into the narrative of the US State Department as a basis to form its perspective toward Sri Lanka's overall national issues.

What this writer understood during the discourse of that meeting and subsequent scrutiny of the 'developed' mind-set of the FSOs was that the U.S.-designation of the Tigers as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997, it's acknowledgment of Norwegian brokered 2002 ceasefire agreement between the GSL and the Tigers ( personally initiated by the then Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage and prime minister (2001-2004) Ranil Wickremasinghe's foreign affairs minister Prof. G.L. Peiris) , encouragement of peace talks between the two warring factions toward a peaceful political settlement and in support of bringing Tamil Tigers to mainstream Sri Lankan affairs, the U.S. tactical and intelligence assistance to defeat the Tigers but short of total annihilation, the United States political maneuver to make the ethnic minority Tamil population stakeholders of Sri Lankan affairs and lowering the hegemony ( a term occasionally used by the FSOs in Colombo during that period) of the majority Sinhalese, a significant policy plank engraved in the overall policy structure of the State Department.

And Mr. John Kerry was the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee all these years until his appointment as Obama's secretary of state in 2013.

The United States intervention in the current Sri Lankan affairs and its effective Geneva involvement, the American lawmakers and policymakers' perennial dialogue with the Tamil Diaspora and their 'advise'/'lectures' to the GSL and the effect of Tamil Diaspora politics in U.S. foreign policy while manipulating those foreign policy planks through the Tamil Diaspora to affect changes in the body politic of Sri Lanka are largely drawn from the perspectives the state department developed between the early eighties and mid-nineties.

Their effects are seen at present.

"The Sinhalese army is killing the Tamils" sentiment continues to govern the American psyche and intensified since the war ended in May 2009 effectively replenished by the professional activists within the Tamil Diaspora - activists who were once with the LTTE propagating its 'self determination' agenda, providing 'material support' to it by way of legal/professional advice, encouraging raising funds for the terror movement and even advocating procurement of arms describing the movement as a liberation organization of the Tamils - bringing Washington and activists of the Diaspora together as strange bed fellows.

What I understood during my tenure with the state department at Colombo's US diplomatic mission was that the U.S. never wanted the LTTE to succeed in their effort to wrest a separate state in the nation's north-east region nor wished a complete annihilation of the movement. Although Washington did not participate in peace talks the Norwegians initiated it allowed the then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to informally get involved in the peace process.

Washington was serious about the Tamil National Issue right throughout this period onto Geneva, and the "Sinhalese army killing the Tamils" sentiment governed the U.S. policy planks that reflected quite well in US Secretary of State Kerry's remarks on 12 February in the presence of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera: 'The thirty-year war with the Tamils over'.

This "Sinhalese army killing the Tamils" and on to Mr. Kerry's "end of the thirty-year war with the Tamils" sentiment - a deep rooted one - led the effective transfer of 'domestic terrorism' to the emergence of much more effective 'Global Diplomatic Insurgency' now seen spearheaded by the former Tiger operatives within the Tamil Diaspora.

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